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THE NONRESIDENT MOTORISTS STATUTE AND
FEDERAL VENUE PROVISIONS
The nonresident motorists statutes generally provide that the use
of the state highways by a nonresident shall be deemed to be an ap-
pointment of a state officer as an agent for the service of process in
any action arising out of such use.1 The constitutionality of such a
statute is beyond question2 and every jurisdiction in the United States
has adopted it in some form.3 This is a convenient method for residents
of the state to obtain service of process on the nonresident motorist.
Other nonresidents may also avail themselves of the statute.4
Service of process under the nonresident motorists statute is suffi-
cient to give jurisdiction to the federal district court as well as to
state courts.5 A problem of venue arises, however, when one nonresi-
dent attempts to commence an action in the federal district court in the
state against another nonresident by service of process under the non-
resident motorists statute.
The recent case of Olberding v. Illinois Central Railroad Co.6 is
typical of the problem. The defendent, a resident of Indiana, was
driving his car in Kentucky when he collided with a railroad overpass.
A train operated by the plaintiff, an Illinois corporation, was subse-
quently derailed on the overpass as a result of the damage caused by
the defendant's accident. The plaintiff brought suit in the federal
court in Kentucky, serving process on the defendant under the Ken-
tucky nonresident motorists statute. The defendant appeared specially
and moved for dismissal on the ground of improper venue. Under the
federal statutes, a civil action in which federal jurisdiction is based
solely on diversity of citizenship may be brought only in the judicial
district where either the plaintiff or the defendant resides. However,
the District Court overruled the defendant's motion to dismiss, stating
' Wis. STATS. (1951) §85.05(3), the Wisconsin nonresident motorists statute,
was repealed by the legislature in the 1953 spring session. However, the
statute was reenacted in toto by the fall session as §85.05(6). See Griffin,
McClelland, and Peck, Survey of 1953 Wisconsin Legislation, 37 MARQ. L.
REv. 233 (1954) at 245.
2 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916) upheld the validity of the first
such statute which required the motorist to actually appoint an agent for
service of process in New Jersey. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1926)
held that such a statute, similar to the present form of the statute, which
made use of the highways the equivalent of actual appointment of an agent
for the service of process, did not violate the constitution.
For a general discussion of the nonresident motorists statutes, spe Scott,
Jurisdiction over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARv. L. Rzv. 563 (1926); Com-
ment, 64 HARV. L. REv. 98 (1950).
3 For a complete list of the various state nonresident motorists statutes, see
Knoop v. Anderson, 71 F. Supp. 832 (Iowa 1947) at 836.
4 State v. Circuit Court for Dane County, 209 Wis. 246, 244 N.W. 766 (1932).5 Fed. Rules Civ. P., Rule 4(d) (7) ; Blunda v. Craig, 74 F. Supp. 9 (Mo. 1947).
6 74 S.C. 83 (1953).
7 U.S.C.A. §1391 (a).
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that the defendant had made an implied waiver of his federal venue
rights by using the state highways when such act constituted an ap-
pointment of an agent for the service of process in the state." The
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff,9 but the
United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the venue pro-
vision had not been waived.
Although the same decision as in the Olberding case had been
rendered in several lower federal courts,'0 it did not come without
some surprise. Had the case been decided before 1939, there would
have been little doubt that one nonresident could not bring suit
against another in a judicial district where neither of them resided."'
This would clearly have been a violation of the federal venue provi-
sion. However, in 1939 the Neirbo decision was handed down.' 2 This
case set forth the rule of implied waiver of venue, stating that, when
a nonresident corporation was required, as a condition of doing bus-
iness in a state, to appoint an agent for service of process, this was a
consent to be sued in any court in the state and therefore an implied
waiver of the federal venue provision which would ordinarily prevent
a suit between two nonresidents in the federal court in that state.' s
The Neirbo case, although contrary to most prior decisions on the
question," remains the settled law of the land and has even been ex-
tended by Congress.' 5
When the same problem of venue arose in federal court suits
between two nonresident motorists, the district courts drew an analogy
to the Neirbo case and found that the appointment of an agent for the
service of process, implied from the nonresident's use of the highways,
also constituted a consent to be sued in any court in the state and there-
fore was an implied waiver of the federal venue provision.'" This rule
8 F. Supp. (1953).
p201 F. 2d 582 (6th Cir., 1953).
2o McCoy v. Siler, 205 F 2d 498 (3rd Cir., 1953); Martin v. Fishbach Truck-
ing Co., 183 F. 2d 53 (1st Cir., 1950) ; Waters v. Plyborn, 93 F. Supp. 651(E.D. Tenn. 1950).
"1 De Laet v. Seltzer, 1 F. Supp. 1022 (E.D.N.Y. 1932).
"2Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165 (1939).
Is "The consent, therefore, extends to any court sitting in the state which ap-
plies the laws of the state." Ibid. at 171.
4 For a summary of the law before the Neirbo case, see Note, 119 A.L.R. 676(1939). This article was supplemented after the Neirbo case by Note, 128
A.L.R. 1447 (1940).
15 28 U.S.C.A. §1391 (c).
16Burke v. Greer, 114 F. Supp. 671 (M.D. Ga. 1953); Falter v. Southwest
Wheel Co., 19 F. Supp. 556 (W.D. Pa. 1953); Archambeau v. Emerson, 108
F. Supp. 28 (W.D. Mich. 1952); Jacobson v. Schuman, 105 F. Supp. 483 (Vt.
1952); Garcia v. Fausto, 97 F. Supp. 583 (E.D. Mo. 1951); Kostamo v.
Brorby, 95 F. Supp. 806 (Neb. 1951); Burnett v. Swenson, 95 F. Supp. 524(W.D. Okla. 1951); Thurman v. Consolidated School District, 94 F. Supp.
616 (Kan. 1950); Urso v. Scales, 90 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Morris
v. Sun-Oil Co., 88 F. Supp. 529 (Md. 1950); Steele v. Dennis, 62 F. Supp.
73 (Md. 1945); Krueger v. Hider, 48 F. Supp. 708 (E.D.S.C. 1943); Andrews
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was unquestioned for ten years until the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the First Circuit refused to accept it in the case of Martin v'.
Fishbach Trucking Co.17 Because it was contrary to what had come to
be looked upon as an established rule, the Martin case provoked a
great deal of criticism from legal writers.' However, the Supreme
Court has now expressed its approval of the Martin case by its de-
cision in the Olberding case.
The distinction between the Neirbo case and the Olberding case,
of course, is apparent. In the Neirbo case the nonresident corporation
had expressly appointed a state official as its agent for the service of
process. In the Olberding case the nonresident defendant had merely
driven his car into the state and the appointment of an agent for the
service of process had been implied from this act. Thus there was an
express appointment of an agent in the one case and an implied ap-
pointment in the other. In both cases, if the action is not to be dis-
missed for improper venue, waiver of the federal venue provision
must be implied from the appointment of an agent for the service
of process. It has long been recognized that there may be a waiver of
the venue provisions implied from conduct."" But if a waiver were
found in the Olberding case, it would be a waiver implied from the
appointment of an agent for the service of process which, in turn, was
implied from the use of the highways. This would be an act implied
from another act which is also implied. The distinction is unquestion-
ably genuine. However, it appears to be based on a technicality.
It is doubtful that this technicality in itself was the reason for dis-
tinguishing the Olberding case from the Neirbo case. The identical
problem had arisen in the case of a nonresident corporation doing bus-
iness in the state without expressly consenting to the appointment
of an agent for the service of process there. The mere fact of doing
intrastate business in a state is sufficient to subject a nonresident corp-
oration to the jurisdiction of the courts of that state by service of pro-
cess on a designated state officer.20 Applying the same analogy to the
v. Joseph Cohen & Sons, 45 F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Tex. 1941); Malkin v. Arun-
del Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (Md. 1941); Williams v. James, 34 F. Supp. 61(W.D. La. 1940).
27 Supra, n. 10.
'
8 Baylor and Steininger, 'The Effect of the Non-Resident Motorists Statute on
Federal Venue Provisions, 32 NEB. L. REv. 383 (1953); Recent Decision, 28
NoRE DAME LAW. 567 (1953) ; Recent Case, 66 HAv. L. REv. 1317 (1953);
Note, 38 CORNEL L. Q. 624 (1953); Note, 31 N. C. L. REv. 339 (1952); Note,
26 IND. L. J. 285 (1951); Note, 24 So. CALiF. L. Rrv. 498 (1951); Comment,
36 IowA L. REv. 705 (1951); Comment, 3 STAN. L.REv. 347 (1951); Rec-
cent Case, 19 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 559 (1951); Recent Decision, 39 Gm. L. J.
143 (1951); Recent Case, 35 MINN. L. REv. 404 (1951); Recent Decision,
49 MicH. L. REv. 1072 (1951); Recent Case, 36 VA. L. Rt v. 1102 (1950).19Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); Commercial Casualty
Insurance Co. v. Consolidated Stone Co., 278 U.S. 177 (1929).20 International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
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Neirbo case as was applied in the nonresident motorists cases before
the Olberding decision, the Knott case2 - held that the appointment of
an agent for the service of process, which was implied from doing
business in the state, constituted an implied waiver of the federal
venue provision. Although this was a waiver implied from an implied
act, almost identical to that which was overruled in the Olberding case,
the Supreme Court refused to reverse the decision,22 and the result of
the Knott case has since been enacted into statute by Congress. 23
Apparently then, the fact that the appointment of an agent for
service of process is implied in the Olberding case and is express in
the Neirbo case is not the real basis of the distinction. Since the facts
are identical in all other respects, the distinction must be founded, to
some extent at least, on the fact that the defendant was a nonresident
corporation in the one case, and a nonresident motorist in the other.
Obviously there are many legal distinctions between the rights of a
corporation and those of an individual. One that is frequently made
is that a state may forbid a nonresident corporation from doing intra-
state business without violating the Constitution while it may not pre-
vent an individual nonresident from entering the state. But this could
hardly be the reason for distinguishing the Olberding case from the
Neirbo case because the right of the state to prevent nonresidents from
entering its boundaries has long been established. 24 In Hess v. Paw-
loski,25 the Supreme Court said:
"And in advance of the operation of a motor vehicle on its
highways by a nonresident, the State may require him to appoint
one of its officials as his agent on whom process may be served
in proceedings growing out of such use. [Citation omitted.2 8 ]
That case recognizes power of the state to exclude a nonresi-
dent until the formal appointment is made."
Consequently, a state may impose the duty of expressly appointing
an agent for the service of process on a nonresident motorist as well
as on a nonresident corporation. It is doubtful, then, that the Olberd-
ing case can be distinguished from the Neirbo case on that ground.
However, it cannot be denied that there is a difference between
the corporation's act of carrying on business in the state and the
motorist's act of driving through the state. Carrying on business,
although a somewhat indefinite concept, 27 entails some regular or sys-
tematic transactions. At least, single or occasional acts by the corpora-
2 1 Knott Corporation v. Furman, 163 F. 2d 199 (4th Cir., 1947).
22 Cert. den., 332 U.S. 809 (1947); Rehearing den., 332 U.S. 826 (1947).
2328 U.S.C.A. §1391 (c) provides that "a corporation may be sued in any judi-
cial district in which it . . . is doing business .24 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916).
25 274 U.S. 352 (1926) at 356.
26Supra, n. 24.2 7 Supra, n. 20.
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tion will not subject it to the jurisdiction of the state.28 On the other
hand, the act of a nonresident motorist in driving on the highways
of the state may merely be a single, isolated act in that state; and yet,
this is sufficient to bring him within the jurisdiction of the state.
However, even this distinction hardly seems a sufficient basis for
differentiating the Olberding case from the Neirbo case. The purpose
of subjecting a nonresident motorist to the jurisdiction of the state
is exactly the same as the purpose for so subjecting a nonresident
corporation. Although the act of one may be isolated and the act of
the other fairly regular, either may give rise to a cause of action in
favor of persons in the state. It is necessary that this person be able
to sue the nonresident in the most convenient court. Yet under the de-
cision in the Olberding case, the nonresident motorist cannot be sued
in the federal court in the state where the cause of action arose while
the nonresident corporation can be sued there.29
Of course, not being able to sue in the federal court in the state
where the cause of action arose does not deprive the plaintiff of his
day in court. Under the federal venue provisions for diversity of
citizenship cases,30 the plaintiff may still bring suit in the federal
court in his own state or in the federal court in the state where the
defendant resides. However, it is usually impossible to bring suit in
the state where the plaintiff resides because the defendant cannot be
served with process there. Suit in the state where the defendant re-
sides is usually not very convenient for the plaintiff. More important
still is the fact that it will usually be too inconvenient for any witnesses
to the accident to appear in a trial in that state. For example, if the
plaintiff resides in Massachusetts and the defendant in California, and
the accident occurred in New York where several eyewitnesses reside,
the inconvenience of a suit in the federal court in California is ap-
parent.
There are additional factors which make it more advantageous to
bring suit in the federal court of the state where the accident occurred.
In the suit the applicable law would be that of the state where the
cause of action arose, and the federal court sitting in that state would
probably be more familiar with that law than would any other fed-
eral court.
The plaintiff could also initiate the suit, if he wished, in the state
court of the state where the accident occurred, obtaining service of
process on the defendent under the nonresident motorists statute.
That court, of course, would be the one most familiar with the ap-
plicable state law. Also, this court would probably be just as conven-
28 Rosenberg Bros. & Co. v. Curtis Brown Co., 260 U.S. 516 (1922).29 Supra, n. 23 and n. 21.
3028 U.S.C.A. §1391 (a).
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ient for the witnesses to the accident as the federal court in the same
state. However, the federal court is usually preferred by a nonresident
of the state when the requisite amount ($3,000) is involved in the
suit. There are several reasons for this. The calendars of the state
courts, especially those in the more populous counties, are usually
far more crowded than those of the federal courts. This means the
difference between a delay of only a few months and one of two to four
years. Another factor is the fact that an attorney from the plaintiff's
own state, one whose capabilities are known to the plaintiff, could con-
duct the suit in the federal court, whereas, in the state court, the plain-
tiff would have to retain an attorney from that state to prosecute
the case for him.
The most persuasive reason of all for allowing the plaintiff to
sue in the federal court in the state where the accident occurred is
the unequal treatment which would otherwise result. If the plaintiff
does sue in the state court where the accident occurred, the defendant
can have the case removed to the federal court in that same state.
". .. any civil action brought in a State court of which the
district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction,
may be removed by the defendant or defendants, to the district
court of the United States for the district and division embrac-
ing the place where such action is pending."31
In diversity of citizenship cases, such removal is allowed even when
none of the parties to the action is a citizen of the state in which the
action is brought.3 2 The fact that suit could not originally have been
brought in that district is immaterial.33
So the result is this. The defendant may have the action in the
federal court if he chooses but the plaintiff may not. When the de-
fendant, who is supposedly the wrongdoer, has such a choice, why
should it be denied to the plaintiff who has suffered the injury? Venue
is a privilege for the convenience of the defendant. But it is difficult
to see how it would be any more inconvenient for the defendant to
have to defend the action in the federal court of the state where the
accident occurred than it is for him to defend it in a state court in
the same state.
Objection by the defendant's attorney to venue in the federal
court in the state where the accident took place has already become
a legal maneuver to delay trial of the case.
"As lawyers, we would do as Neff did in Martin v. Fishbach
and make the venue objection. Result? Mitchell has to go to the
3128 U.S.C.A. §1441 (a).
32 28 U.S.C.A. §1441 (b).
33 Bunn, Jurisdiction and Practice of the Courts of the United States (5th ed.
1949), Chap. 6, §5.
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expense and trouble of starting over again in the Massachusetts
state court and he is softened up for a settlement.
"From the lofty viewpoint of jurisprudence, however, noth-
ing could 'be more absurb than to countenance such monkey-
shines. Meaningless technicalities such as these drag the lawyer
down in public esteem."3 4
The plaintiff is therefore required to commence his action in the state
court if he wishes to sue in the state where the accident occurred. Or
if he prefers to bring.suit in a federal court, he must sue in the state
of the defendant's residence where service of process is possible, but
where few, if any, witnesses would be able to attend.
The reason for denying the plaintiff the use of the federal court
in the state where the cause of action arose is difficult to understand.
"Where the federal court has jurisdiction and process can be
validly served, venue should not prevent an action from being
tried in the federal court which is most convenient for witnesses
and parties and where, in the interest of justice for all, it should
be tried."35
If the purpose of denying the use of the federal courts to the plain-
tiff is an attempt to discourage federal court suits based solely on
diversity of citizenship and to thereby lighten the load on the federal
courts, it seems to be a very poor policy. This would only increase the
burden on the state courts, many of which are already far behind on
their calendars.
However, although there are many reasons for finding an implied
waiver of the federal venue provision in the case of a nonresident
motorist, perhaps the decision in the Olberding case should not be
criticized too severely. It is true that to imply the waiver would be an
extension of the Neirbo case (although not of the Knott case). Per-
haps the Court hesitated to carry the doctrine of implied waiver of
venue any further because this might possibly have set too broad a
precedent for other situations when there would not be such persuasive
reasons for implying the waiver.
In any event, since the Supreme Court has taken its stand in the
Olberding case, the only possibility of securing the right of a nonresi-
dent plaintiff to sue another nonresident in the federal court in the
state where the cause of action arose now appears to be a change in
the federal statutes.386
"The policy of the federal venue statute would be protected and
judicial administration facilitated by allowing suit at the scene
-' Keeffe, Venue and Removal Jokers in the New Federal Judicial Code, 38
VA. L. REv. 569 (1952) at 584.
35 Ibid. at 587.36 Note, 38 CoRNE. L. Q. 624 (1935) ; Note, 31 N. C. L. Rzv. 339 (1953) ; Recent
Decision, 39 VA. L. REv. 985 (1953).
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of the accident. If, however, the decision in the instant case
[Martin v. Fishbach] is justified by strict construction of
the statutory provision, there would appear to be a strong argu-
ment for amending the statute to correct the present situa-
tion."13
Such a statutory change could attain the result desired in the case of
nonresident motorists without any danger of expanding the concept of
implied waiver of venue too far. It would therefore seem that Congress
should enlarge the venue provisions to allow suit against a nonresi-
dent motorist in the state where the cause of action arose when the
plaintiff is not a resident of that state.
DARRELL L. PECK
37 Comment, 36 IowA L. REv. 705 (1951) at 708.
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